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A Lease as State Action: Burton
and Moose Lodge Revisited
Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.
1975), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 530 F.2d 16, cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 186 (1976).
I. INTRODUCTION
At what point does state involvement in a private activity be-
come a "symbiotic relationship"' or indicate that a state has "in-
sinuated itself into a position of interdependence" 2 with the chal-
lenged actor so as to justify the application of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment?3 Since it was posed by the
Civil Rights Cases,4 this question has admitted of no easy answer.
5
The Supreme Court, when considering the question, repeatedly6 has
instructed lower federal courts dutifully to "sift facts and weigh
circumstances ' 7 to resolve it. Yet now, almost 100 years after Jus-
tice Bradley's institutionalization of the requirement of "state ac-
tion" in fourteenth amendment litigation,8 no measure of certainty
in the application of the test of state action is discernable. Appro-
priately, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
1. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972).
2. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
3. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
5. See, e:g., Note, State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional
Restrictions to Private Activity, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 656 (1974); Com-
ment, State Action and the Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REv. 840 (1974);
54 TEXAS L. REv. 641 (1975).
6. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Gilmore
v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961).
7. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
8. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) ("It is State action of a
particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of indi-
vidual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment.").
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has, after the second trip through the sifter, reversed its panel opin-
ion and found that no state action existed in the lessee-lessor situa-
tion presented by Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club.9
II. THE CONTROVERSY
Plaintiffs Golden and Fincher, upon applying for membership
in the all-white, all-Christian Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, were in-
formed by the club that in order to qualify for membership, they
first had to be sponsored by three members of the club. This spon-
sorship selection process was governed by the club's charter and
by-laws, which took no affirmative position regarding the member-
ship potential of blacks or Jews.1 0 However, as the district court
found, the club engaged in systematic, though subtle, discrimination
against members of the black race and the Jewish faith.1
Golden and Fincher sought injunctive and declaratory relief in
the federal district court on the basis of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,12 1983,11
and 2000a.14  They premised the application of the fourteenth
9. 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 530 F.2d 16,
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 186 (1976).
10. 521 F.2d at 347.
11. 370 F. Supp. at 1043.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970):
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence,
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings
for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penal-
ties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1970):
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal en-
joyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advan-
tages, and accomodations of any place of public accomoda-
tion, as defined in this section, without discrimination or seg-
regation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national ori-
gin.
(d) Discrimination or segregation by an establishment is
supported by State action within the meaning of this subchap-
ter if such discrimination or segregation (1) is carried on un-
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amendment, and consequently the remedial' 5 legislation enacted
pursuant to it, on the club's lease of bay bottom land from the City
of Miami. The lease, they contended, provided the state involve-
ment necessary to bring the club's activities within the ambit of
fourteenth amendment scrutiny which, they argued, would result
in the injunction of the club's membership practices. The district
court,"6 and the original panel of the circuit court 17 agreed. On
rehearing en banc, however, the Fifth Circuit held that the rela-
tionship between the state and the club as created by the lease
was insufficient to activate the fourteenth amendment's proscrip-
tions.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Golden case thus presents an interesting combination of the
factors which produced two significant Supreme Court precedents
relating to state action. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity,'8 the Court held that a lease of commercial property by a state
made it a "joint participant in the challenged activity"'19 of refusing
restaurant service to black patrons, and that the activity was a vio-
lation of the equal protection clause. However, Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,20 found in-
sufficient state action to warrant a constitutional proscription of
the refusal of service to a black guest of one of a private club's
members. Both factors, a lease of state-owned property, and a pri-
vate club as the challenged actor, were present in the Golden case,
and posed a seemingly perplexing problem of interpretation of the
Supreme Court's decisions. The problem, however, is not merely
der color of any law, statute, ordinance, or regulation; or (2)
is carried on under color of any custom or usage required or
enforced by officials of the State or political subdivision
thereof; or (3) is required by action of the State or political
subdivision thereof.
(e) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a
private club or other establishment not in fact open to the
public, except to the extent that the facilities of such estab-
lishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an
establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this sec-
tion.
15. The issue of whether the fourteenth amendment may be implemented
by primary legislation is beyond the scope of this note. Suffice it to
say that the issue is far from resolution. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary,
96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
16. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
17. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1975).
18. 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
19. Id. at 725.
20. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
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one of interpretive reading, but of upon what basic premise an
analysis of the fourteenth amendment's guarantees should proceed.
The Golden court took the position that the scope of its review
in determining the existence of state action should consist of a case-
by-case, factual resolution approach. To exercise this limited power
of review, the court first armed itself with the applicable legal prin-
ciples as articulated by the Supreme Court. A review of the Su-
preme Court precedents, however, reveals that a state action issue
cannot be resolved on a purely factual basis, but must be viewed
as the application of a definitive set of ascertainable legal principles
to a given set of facts.
The Civil Rights Cases,21 decided in 1883, provide the backdrop
for all state action litigation. The cases present a simple, logical
interpretation of the fourteenth amendment's scope. Clearly, the
amendment's drafters could not have intended that private discrim-
inatory activities were forbidden by the amendment, in view of the
express language they chose.22  However, even with agreement
from all quarters 23 that there must be state involvement to activate
the amendment's proscriptions, the controversy among jurists over
what standards to use in determining the existence of that state
involvement continues to rage. The decision in Golden reflects the
controversy that infiltrates the federal bench as a result of sharply
divided Supreme Court precedent.
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, a seminal case in
modern state action litigation, contains the shibboleths which have
become standards to apply in determining the existence of govern-
ment involvement which rises to the level necessary to trigger the
fourteenth amendment. The test of Burton, as opposed to the
easily cited language the Court uses, is basically a determination
of whether the state either provides support to a private actor
whose discriminatory practices are challenged, or derives a benefit,
financial or otherwise, from the discriminatory activity.
Appended to the Burton test is another test, most recently ar-
21. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
22. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
23. The associational rights which our system honors permit all
white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.
They also permit all Catholic, all Jewish, or all agnostic clubs
to be established. Government may not tell a man or a woman
who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as
selective as he desires.
Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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ticulated, but not followed, in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.24
The test Jackson purports to apply is a determination of whether
a private actor, which may or may not receive governmental sup-
port, has become so imbued with a governmental character that
its actions will be treated judicially as tantamount to those of the
state.25 As a result of the Jackson rationale, which is virtually the
same as that expressed by Justice Harlan in his dissent in the Civil
Rights Cases,26 three clearly articulated tests of state action are cog-
nizable: (1) the state provides support to a private, discriminatory
actor; (2) the state derives a benefit from the discrimination; and
(3) the private actor acts with a governmental character so that
its actions are treated as those of the state.
The latter test, i.e., the private actor, who, for whatever reason,
takes on a position relatively analogous to the state and is conse-
quently treated congruently with the state for fourteenth amend-
ment purposes, obviously has no application in the Golden situation.
Yet the Fifth Circuit viewed Jackson as authority for the proposi-
tion that satisfaction of the "significant" state action test requires a
finding that the challenged action be tied sufficiently to the state so
as to be treated as the action of the state itself.27 This is quite
clearly an unwarranted application of the Jackson test. The Bis-
cayne Bay Yacht Club, at least on the record made in the district
court, hardly can be viewed in the same light as the public utility
in Jackson for state action purposes. In fact, the Filth Circuit
quite realistically reached the conclusion that "[t]he club was
genuinely private.128 It is unjustifiable to read the Jackson test
as a further hurdle for the plaintiff in a state action case to clear,
rather than as a distinct test to be applied in a situation in which
state action is alleged on the basis of a private actor becoming
imbued with a governmental character.
While the Jackson test clearly has no application to the Golden
situation, one of the two tests articulated in Burton just as clearly
does have application.
Burton proceeded from the basic premise that the fourteenth
amendment should be construed as a constitutional prohibition
against state-supported discrimination, no matter how indirectly
24. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
25. See id. at 351.
26. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 37-43 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing).
27. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 19 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 186 (1976).
28. Id. at 17.
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the state chooses to provide that support. The original panel opin-
ion of the Fifth Circuit in Golden noted that the Biscayne Bay
Yacht Club was the recipient of a very favorable lease price for the
bay bottom land in question.2 9 The district court's opinion, while
not specifically finding as a fact that the lease price of one dollar
per year amounted to a subsidy of the club by the city, clearly
proceeded from the unarticulated premise that it did: "Here . ..
the defendant Club enjoys a select privilege not available to each
citizen but one coveted by many citizens in the South Florida area.
More critically, the privilege is essential to the Club's operation."30
Both the district court and the circuit's panel opinion thus con-
cluded that the one-dollar lease price was a form of state support
for the challenged activity.
However, the en banc court rather blithely disregarded this
clear-cut nexus: "There is no finding in this record that the lease
fee is grossly inadequate, amounts to subsidy for the club, or repre-
sents a substantial financial contribution to the operation of the
club."'3 1 As previously noted, the real issue facing the en banc court
was a determination of upon what basic premise an analysis of the
protections afforded by the fourteenth amendment should proceed.
It appears that the court did not choose the amendment as being
a viable tool for the eradication of racial or religious discrimination.
Golden thus reflects, like Moose Lodge, the superficial factual
treatment courts have accorded Burton in finding no state action.
In both cases, the courts emphasized that the actor whose conduct
was challenged was a private club in a private building on privately
owned property whose internal affairs were in no way governed
by the state. Such an analysis fails to recognize the thrust of the
Burton holding. Though Burton does stand for the proposition that
courts must sift facts and weigh circumstances in a case-by-case
approach to the state action problem, the Burton court specifically
pointed out that the factual approach it found desirable was de-
signed to ferret out "the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct .... 32 Thus, by a concerted attempt to read Bur-
ton as a limited holding, rather than as an affirmative policy state-
ment regarding the extent to which the fourteenth amendment's
proscription of state-condoned discrimination should apply, the
Moose Lodge and Golden courts managed to inject a sufficient
29. See Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 521 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir.
1975).
30. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 370 F. Supp. 1038, 1042 (S.D. Fla.
1973).
31. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 186 (1976).
32. 365 U.S. at 722.
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amount of speculation into state action litigation to allow the mask-
ing of a policy decision against the protection of civil rights with
a screen of precedent. Armed with this group of uncertain and
unmanageable standards, the lower courts are free to decide state
action cases on an ad hoc basis, virtually insulated from significant
review. If the lower courts are free to decide a constitutional issue
of such magnitude on pure policy grounds, private actors who po-
tentially could be construed as state actors hardly can be expected
to conform to a constitutional standard. Far more important, an
individual can only guess whether an infringement of his constitu-
tional rights has occurred, unless he or she is possessed of the same
ability to "sift facts and weigh circumstances" as is the Supreme
Court.
IV. THE RACIAL DISCRIMINATION-
OTHER VIOLATION DICHOTOMY
The original panel opinion, and the petitioners' request for re-
view in the Supreme Court,33 both present a significant, albeit tan-
gential issue which necessitates discussion. Initially, the panel
opinion of the circuit court distinguished racial discrimination and
"other types of constitutional violations, '34 asserting that a much
lower threshold of state action will suffice to trigger the fourteenth
amendment's proscriptions in cases of racial discrimination.3 5 The
en banc court did little more than recognize the problem through
continual characterizations of precedent as being either racial dis-
crimination cases or as involving some other form of constitutional
violation, and wholly failed to come to grips with the issue.
The distinction is a valid one in terms of the relevant case law,
3 6
but its absurdity is classically illustrated by the Golden situation.
Strict adherence to the distinction by the panel opinion would have
made it impossible for the court to afford Golden the same four-
teenth amendment protection as Fincher-merely because he was
not black. The only logical conclusion the court could have
reached, without a showing of more significant state action, was
to enforce the constitutional prohibitions with respect to the claim
of plaintiff Fincher, and to deny the fourteenth amendment's pro-
tections as to plaintiff Golden. Faced with this dilemma, the panel
opinion, rather than taking the seemingly revolutionary view37 that
33. Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club, 530 F.2d 16 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 186 (1976).
34. 521 F.2d at 351.
35. See id. at 350-51.
36. See id. at 350-51 nn. 12-14.
37. This view is revolutionary only in terms of precedent. Many so-called
"landmark" decisions have followed the principle that the constitu-
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the fourteenth amendment should prohibit all discrimination, re-
gardless of its character, asserted:
We believe, in this context, religious discrimination against the
Jewish applicant carries the same stigma of inferiority and badge
of opprobrium that is characteristic of racial discrimination. Ac-
cordingly, we apply the well developed standards utilized in the
racial discrimination setting to both litigants, for the gravity of
harm is exactly the same as to both plaintiffs and there exists no
rational basis for distinguishing between them by allowing relief
as to one while denying it to the other.38
By analogizing plaintiff Golden's position to that of his black coun-
terpart through the use of language characteristic of a thirteenth
amendment analysis,3 9 the panel avoided the problem it found in-
herent in the fourteenth amendment by applying the proscriptions
of the thirteenth. The contradictory nature of this reasoning is ap-
parent. Constrained by precedent from finding a violation of the
fourteenth amendment, which on its face makes no reference to a
particular class of persons to whom it should apply, the court based
its holding on the thirteenth amendment, which by its terms ap-
plies to "slavery and involuntary servitude, '40 a condition imposed
upon only one group of people at the time of the amendment's
passage-blacks.
While this was the basis of the panel's holding, the language
used indicates a potentially far-reaching (and far more rational)
test which would apply the fourteenth amendment's guarantees to
all aggrieved plaintiffs, regardless of their status in terms of the
type of discrimination to which they have been subjected.
By focusing on the "gravity of harm"41 to both plaintiffs, and
concluding that "there exists no rational basis for distinguishing
between them,"42 the panel shifted the emphasis of its inquiry from
a determination of whether state action existed to an analysis of
the respective injury suffered by each plaintiff. Presumably, this
would not entail a complete rejection of the state action require-
tion is a "living document" that should be construed with an eye to
changing situations, social values, and practical circumstances. See,
e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. ( Cranch) 137 (1803).
38. 521 F.2d at 351.
39. See id. ("the same stigma of inferiority and badge of opprobrium that
is characteristic of racial discrimination").
40. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1: "Neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction."
41. 521 F.2d at 351.
42. Id.
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ment, but the establishment of a floor of state action, above which
any person who suffers as a result will be afforded relief, regard-
less of the nature of the constitutional violation, be it racial dis-
crimination or not. This is a far better approach to the problem
than an absurd distinction between "racial discrimination" and
"other types of constitutional violations." It establishes that soci-
ety, as reflected by the courts, will not tolerate any contravention
of a constitutional guarantee, without reference to the status of the
party whose rights have been violated.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether any form of discrimination amounts to a violation of
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is an issue
now capable of being resolved on the basis of an ad hoc policy de-
termination. Buttressed by precedent that allows a reviewing court
the latitude necessary to discount the importance of some circum-
stances, in favor of others, the constitutionally protected right of
equality is subject to a balancing analysis which fosters virtually
unpredictable results. Until courts resolve themselves to the view
that fourteenth amendment litigation must proceed from the basic
premise that society will not tolerate the use of its collective re-
sources to support discriminatory activities, the problem presented
by Golden v. Biscayne Bay Yacht Club will minimize the worth
of the amendment as a means of eradicating discrimination.
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